The discussions which took place in Moscow on October 24 and 25 in the frame of the “Valdai Club” and which the author attended allowed to clarify a certain number of issues concerning Russian diplomacy. Not the least of these, stated by M. Andrei Pushkov (President of the Foreign Affairs Commission at the Duma) as well as by M. Serguei Ivanov (former Minister of Defense and presently head of the Presidential Administration) was that Russia would from now on be stressing what we call “soft power.” Indeed, both of them declared that the elements of military power, if they remained important in localized crises, had lost some of their significance to the benefit of elements of economic power, but also of political and cultural influence. This confirms an important evolution in Russian diplomacy. It implies the development of an “economic diplomacy,” the goal of which is not merely to reinforce the positions of Russia, but which will also allow it to establish important relationships in the economic as well as in the political domain. This goes way beyond what has been called in recent years “the diplomacy of oil and gas”.
As matters stand, this economic diplomacy of Russia is presently undergoing important changes. It is not wrong to consider that it is oscillating between attraction towards Asia, and more specifically towards the Asia-Pacific zone, and disappointment in regard to Europe, as concretized in President Putin’s severe assessment of the Euro crisis. It is important, from the standpoint of European countries such as France, to be aware of these, if they don’t want to find themselves relegated within a few years into a position of little importance.
Given the importance of the subject, we report here as faithfully as possible what was said on October 25 (this translation is made from the French, not the original Russian – note of the translator).
The crisis is in reality much deeper than a debt crisis. We know, from experience, that the accumulation of debt is but a symptom. The governments and institutions of the Euro-zone have committed a grave error in taking on the Euro crisis by way of the debt question. The crisis of the Euro is much graver and deeper than the debt crisis.
When one wants to create a single currency (in Russian: a common currency)one must take into account four factors: the technological level of the countries of this monetary zone, the problems of relative competitivity and of the harmonisation of the labor markets, the problems of political integration and the problems of a community of language . This was not the case in Europe. The Euro was created foremost for political reasons, and without taking these factors into account. The present crisis was therefore inevitable. One wanted to take a big step forward and it was done without preparations. This is another error. A much more pragmatic and much less dogmatic approach would have been necessary.
When the crisis broke out, the responses were inadequate. Only the symptoms of the crisis were treated, country after country, and without an organized plan. This can only lead to failure. The system of political power is the worst that can be. One has the costs of federalism but not its advantages, nor its coordination. I can see no real coordination in the past nor in the future when reading attentively the various accords which have been signed. Either the countries of the Euro-zone adopt a true (tchistny) federalism -but do they only know what this will imply in the way of transfer flows -or they will have to find another solution. If complete federalism is not possible, then one will have to give oneself important margins of flexibility.
We are disposed to aid European governments if they decide on reasonable policies.
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